We devote this article to the axiomatization/completeness of PRSPDL 0 -a variant of iteration-free PDL with parallel composition. Our results are based on the following: although the program operation of parallel composition is not modally definable in the ordinary language of PDL, it becomes definable in a modal language strengthened by the introduction of propositional quantifiers. Instead of using axioms to define the program operation of parallel composition in the language of PDL enlarged with propositional quantifiers, we add an unorthodox rule of proof that makes the canonical model standard for the program operation of parallel composition and we use large programs for the proof of the Truth Lemma.
Introduction
Propositional dynamic logic (PDL) is an applied logic par excellence. Designed for reasoning about the behaviour of programs [12, 15, 17] , its syntax is based on the idea of associating with each program α of some programming language the modal operator [α] , formulas [α]φ being read 'all executions of α from the current state lead to a state where φ holds'. Syntactically, PDL is a modal logic with a structure in the set of modal operators: sequential composition (α;β) of programs α and β corresponds to the composition of the accessibility relations R(α) and R (β) ; test φ? on formula φ corresponds to the partial identity relation in the subsets of the Kripke models in which the formula φ is true; iteration α ⋆ corresponds to the reflexive and transitive closure of R(α). The problem with PDL is that the states of the Kripke models in which formulas are evaluated have no internal structure. However, in the field of applied logics, formalisms with which one can cope with structured data are needed.
In separation logics, the formula construct (·•·) of separating conjunction, formulas (φ •ψ) being read 'the memory model can be split into 2 disjoint models respectively satisfying φ and ψ', and the formula construct (·-•·) of adjoint implication, formulas (φ-•ψ) being read 'if the memory model is extended with a model satisfying φ, the resulting model satisfies ψ', are added to the standard Boolean constructs [8, 10, 18, 19] . The propositional dynamic logic with storing, recovering and parallel composition (PRSPDL) introduced by Benevides et al. [5] , is a separation-based logic too. Its Kripke models are structured by means of a function ⋆: the state x belongs to the result of applying the function ⋆ to the states y,z iff x can be separated in a first part y and a second part z. Its syntax is obtained from the PDL-syntax by adding the program construct (· ·) of parallel composition, the storing programs s 1 and s 2 and the recovering programs r 1 and r 2 . Among the separation logics considered in [8, 10, 18, 19] , the one developed by Collinson and Pym [10] is the sole separation logic Example: By definition, f (a (b;c)) = (⊤?;a;⊤?) (⊤?;b;⊤?;c;⊤?). The function f will be of use to us when we define the axiomatization of PRSPDL 0 , in particular the formula (A14). The set PAR of all parametrized programs and the set ADM of all admissible forms are inductively defined as follows:
•α,β −→ ¬φ? | (α;β) | (α;β) | (α β) | (α β );
where ♯ is a new atomic formula and α,β range over PR. We will useα,β,... for parametrized actions andφ,ψ,... for admissible forms.
Example: If α,β,γ are programs, α (β;¬♯?;γ ) is a parametrized program and [α (β;¬♯?;γ ) ]⊥ is an admissible form.
Let α(φ?) be a program with φ? some of its tests. The result of the replacement of φ? in its place with a parametrized programβ is a parametrized program which will be denoted α (β) .
Example: If α,β,γ are programs, φ is a formula andδ is a parametrized program, the result of the replacement of φ? in its place in the program α (β;φ?;γ ) withδ is the parametrized program α (β;δ;γ ).
It is well worth noting that parametrized actions and admissible forms are finite strings of symbols coming from a countable alphabet. It follows that there are countably many parametrized actions and countably many admissible forms. Remark that in each expressionȇ xp (either a parametrized action, or an admissible form), ♯ has a unique occurrence. The result of the replacement of ♯ in its place in ȇ xp with a formula φ is an expression (either a program, or a formula) which will be denotedȇ xp (φ) . It is inductively defined as follows:
• ¬ψ?(φ) = ¬ψ(φ)?, • (α;β)(φ) =α(φ);β, • (α;β)(φ) = α;β(φ), • (α β)(φ) =α(φ) β,
Example: Ifȇ xp is the parametrized programs α (β;¬♯?;γ ),ȇ xp(φ) is the program α (β;¬φ?;γ ) and ifȇ xp is the admissible form [α (β;¬♯?;γ )]⊥,ȇ xp(φ) is the formula [α (β;¬φ?;γ )]⊥.
We will use parametrized actions and admissible forms when we define the axiomatization of PRSPDL 0 , in particular the rule of proof (FOR).
Semantics
This section presents the semantics of PRSPDL 0 . A frame is a 3-tuple F = (W ,R,⋆) where W is a nonempty set of states, R is a function from the set of all atomic programs into the set of all binary relations between states and ⋆ is a function from the set of all pairs of states into the set of all sets of states. We will use x,y,... for states. The set W of states in a frame F = (W ,R,⋆) is to be regarded as the set of all possible states in a computation process, the function R from the set of all atomic programs into the set of all binary relations between states associates with each atomic program a the binary relation R(a) on W with xR(a)y meaning that 'y can be reached from x by performing atomic program a' and the function ⋆ from the set of all pairs of states into the set of all sets of states associates with each pair (x,y) of states the subset x ⋆y of W with z ∈ x ⋆y meaning that 'z is a possible combination of x and y'. We shall say that a frame F = (W ,R,⋆) is functional iff for all x,y,z ∈ W , if xR(a)y and xR(a)z, y = z for every program variable a. For all z ∈ W , let ⋆(z) = {(x,y): z ∈ x ⋆y}. Now, card(·) denoting the cardinality function, we consider the following classes of frames:
• separated frames, i.e. frames F = (W ,R,⋆) such that for all x ∈ W , card(⋆(x)) ≤ 1;
• rich frames, i.e. frames F = (W ,R,⋆) such that for all x ∈ W , card(⋆(x)) ≥ 1; • deterministic frames, i.e. frames F = (W ,R,⋆) such that for all x,y ∈ W , card(x ⋆y) ≤ 1;
• serial frames, i.e. frames F = (W ,R,⋆) such that for all x,y ∈ W , card(x ⋆y) ≥ 1.
In separated frames, there is at most one way to decompose a given state; in rich frames, there is at least one way to decompose a given state; in deterministic frames, there is at most one way to combine 2 given states; in serial frames, there is at least one way to combine 2 given states. Each frame considered in [5] is separated and deterministic whereas each frame considered in [13, Chapter 1] is separated, deterministic and serial.
Example: Let W 1 be the set of all words on an alphabet and ⋆ 1 be the operation of concatenation. The structure F 1 = (W 1 ,⋆ 1 ) is not separated. Nevertheless, it is rich, deterministic and serial. Let W 2 be the set of all binary trees and ⋆ 2 be the operation of join. The structure F 2 = (W 2 ,⋆ 2 ) is not rich. Nevertheless, it is separated, deterministic and serial. Let W 3 be the set of all heaps (partially defined functions mapping locations to values) and ⋆ 3 be the operation of union (undefined when domains overlap). The structure F 3 = (W 3 ,⋆ 3 ) is neither separated, nor serial. Nevertheless, it is rich and deterministic.
A model on F is a 4-tuple M = (W ,R,⋆,V ) where V : p → V (p) ⊆ W is a valuation on F, i.e. a function from the set of all atomic formulas into the set of all sets of states. In M, programs are interpreted as binary relations over W and formulas are interpreted as subsets of W as follows:
The definition of the binary relation over W interpretating programs of the form α β is in accordance with the definition given by Benevides et al. [5] . It says that to execute such a program from x to y consists in three steps: (i) decompose x into z and t; (ii) from z and t, separately execute α and β in parallel, thus reaching u,v; (iii) combine u and v into y. Of course, α β cannot be executed from x to y when it is not possible to decompose x and y in pairs (z,t), (u,v) 
Obviously,
Proposition 1
Let M = (W ,R,⋆,V ) be a model. For all programs α and for all formulas φ, ( α φ) M = {x: there exists y ∈ W such that x(α) M y and y ∈ (φ) M }.
Proof. By definition. Left to the reader.
We shall say that a formula φ is valid in a model
A formula φ is said to be valid in a frame F, in symbols F |= φ, iff for all models M on F, M |= φ. The validity in a frame F of a set of formulas, in symbols F |= , is defined in a similar way. We shall say that a formula φ is valid in a class C of frames, in symbols C |= φ, iff for all frames F in C, F |= φ. A class C of frames is said to be modally defined by a set of formulas iff for all frames F, F is in C iff F |= . We shall say that a class of frames is modally definable iff it is modally defined by a set of formulas.
Example: The class of all functional frames is modally defined by the formulas a p → [a]p for every atomic program a.
A model is said to be functional (respectively, separated, rich, deterministic, serial) iff it is based on a functional (respectively, separated, rich, deterministic, serial) frame. Let M = (W ,R,⋆,V ) be a model. The property 'state z can be reached from state x by performing parametrized actionα via state y in M'-in symbols xR M (α,y)z-and the property 'admissible formφ is true at state x via state y in M'-in symbols x ∈ V M (φ,y)-are inductively defined as follows:
• xR M (¬φ?,y)z iff x = z and z ∈ V M (φ,y);
• xR M (α;β,y)z iff there exists t ∈ W such that xR M (α,y)t and t(β) M z;
• xR M (α;β,y)z iff there exists t ∈ W such that x(α) M t and tR M (β,y)z;
• xR M (α β,y)z iff there exists t,u,v,w ∈ W such that x ∈ t ⋆u, z ∈ v⋆w, tR M (α,y)v and u(β) M w;
These properties are quite abstract. The following Proposition can help the reader to grasp what they mean.
Proposition 2
Let M = (W ,R,⋆,V ) be a model. For all expressionsȇ xp (either a parametrized action, or an admissible form),
• ifȇ xp is a parametrized action, for all formulas φ and for all x,z ∈ W , x (ȇ xp(φ)) M z iff there exists y ∈ W such that xR M (ȇ xp,y)z and y ∈ (φ) M ; • ifȇ xp is an admissible form, for all formulas φ and for all
Proof. By induction onȇ xp. Left to the reader.
We will make use of Proposition 2 when we establish the soundness for PRSPDL 0 .
be models and p be an atomic formula. We shall say that M and
• for all expressions exp (either a program, or a formula), if p does not occur in exp,
Proof. By induction on exp,α andφ. Left to the reader.
The next four Propositions present valid formulas and rules of proof preserving validity.
Proposition 4 (Validity 1)
The following formulas are valid in the class of all frames:
Proof. For (A1)-(A10), by definition. For (A11) and (A12), by induction on α. Left to the reader.
Proposition 5 (Validity 2)
The following formulas are valid in the class of all separated frames:
Proposition 6 (Admissibility 1)
The following rules of proof preserve validity in the class of all frames:
Proof. The rules of proof (MP) and (N) are probably familiar to the reader. See [7, Chapter 1] for the proof that they preserve validity in the class of all separated frames.
Proposition 7 (Admissibility 2)
The following rule of proof preserve validity in the class of all separated frames:
Proof. Suppose (FOR) does not preserve validity in the class of all separated frames. Hence, there exists an admissible formφ, there exists programs α,β and there exists a formula ψ such that for all atomic formulas p not occurring inφ,α,β,ψ,φ( r 1 α s 1 (ψ ∧p)∨ r 2 β s 2 (ψ ∧¬p)) is valid in the class of all separated frames andφ( α β ψ) is not valid in the class of all separated frames. Thus, there exists a separated frame
there exists y ∈ W such that x ∈ V M (φ,y) and y ∈ ( α β ψ) M . Let p be an atomic formula not occurring inφ,α,β,ψ and
is valid in the class of all separated frames and F is separated, F |=φ(
The axiomatization of PRSPDL 0 given in Section 6 will be based on the formulas and the rules of proof contained in Propositions 4-7.
Expressivity
About expressivity, we now illustrate the interest of our new constructs for programs and formulas. More precisely, we show that, in the class of all separated models, the following constructs for programs cannot be eliminated without strictly weakening the expressivity of the language: tests (Proposition 8), storing programs (Proposition 9), recovering programs (Proposition 10), sequential composition (Proposition 11) and parallel composition (Proposition 12).
Proposition 8
For all test-free formulas φ, the formulas a (a; b ⊤?;a) ⊤ and φ are not equally interpreted in all separated models.
Proof. Suppose there exists a test-free formula φ from the language of PRSPDL 0 such that the formulas a (a; b ⊤?;a) ⊤ and φ are equally interpreted in all separated models. Without loss of generality, assume a,b are the only program variables in φ and φ contains no propositional variable. Moreover, in this proof, we will assume that a and b are the only syntactic elements occurring in programs and formulas. Let F = (W ,R,⋆) and F ′ = (W ′ ,R ′ ,⋆ ′ ) be the separated frames defined as follows: W = {x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 ,x 4 ,x 5 ,x 6 ,x 7 ,x 8 ,x 9 ,x 10 ,x 11 ,x 12 }, R(a) = {(x 2 ,x 5 ),(x 3 ,x 4 ),(x 3 , x 9 ),(x 4 ,x 6 ),(x 9 ,x 11 )}, R(b) = {(x 4 ,x 8 )} and R is otherwise empty, x 2 ⋆x 3 = {x 1 }, x 5 ⋆x 6 = {x 7 }, x 10 ⋆ x 11 = {x 12 } and ⋆ is otherwise empty,
Since a (a; b ⊤?;a) ⊤ ↔ φ is valid in the class of all separated frames, F |= a (a; b ⊤?;a) ⊤ ↔ φ and F ′ |= a (a; b ⊤?;a) ⊤ ↔ φ. Let us consider the following binary relation:
Claim: Let α be a test-free program from the language of PRSPDL 0 . For all u ∈ W and for all u ′ ∈ W ′ ,
Proof: By induction on α. Left to the reader.
Claim: Let α be a test-free program from the language of PRSPDL 0 . For all u,v ∈ W and for all
Claim: Let α be a test-free program from the language of PRSPDL 0 . For all u ∈ W \{x 9 } and for all
. Proof: By induction on α. Left to the reader.
Claim: Let α be a test-free program and ψ be a test-free formula from the language of PRSPDL 0 . For all r ∈ W and for all r ′ ∈ W ′ , if rZr ′ ,
Proof: By induction on α and ψ. Left to the reader. Since φ is test-free, x 1 Zx ′ 1 and
• For all s 1 -free formulas φ, the formulas s 1 ⊤ and φ are not equally interpreted in all separated models; • for all s 2 -free formulas φ, the formulas s 2 ⊤ and φ are not equally interpreted in all separated models.
Proof. Suppose there exists an s 1 -free formula φ from the language of PRSPDL 0 such that s 1 ⊤ ↔ φ is valid in the class of all separated frames. Without loss of generality, assume φ contains neither program variable, nor propositional variable. Moreover, in this proof, we will assume that programs and formulas contain no syntactic element. Let F = (W ,R,⋆) and F ′ = (W ′ ,R ′ ,⋆ ′ ) be the separated frames defined as follows: W = {x,y}, R is the empty function, x ⋆x = {y} and otherwise ⋆ is the empty function, W ′ = {x ′ ,y ′ }, R ′ is the empty function and ⋆ ′ is the empty function. Since s 1 ⊤ ↔ φ is valid in the class of all separated frames, F |= s 1 ⊤ ↔ φ and
Claim: Let α be an s 1 -free program from the language of PRSPDL 0 . For all r ∈ W and for all r ′ ∈ W ′ ,
Claim: Let α be an s 1 -free program and ψ be an s 1 -free formula from the language of PRSPDL 0 . Then,
Proof: By induction on α and ψ. Left to the reader. Since φ is s 1 -free and x ∈ (φ) M , x ′ ∈ (φ) M ′ : a contradiction. The argument concerning s 2 is similar to the previous argument.
Proposition 10
• for all r 1 -free formulas φ, the formulas r 1 ⊤? ⊤ and φ are not equally interpreted in all separated models; • for all r 2 -free formulas φ, the formulas ⊤? r 2 ⊤ and φ are not equally interpreted in all separated models.
Proof. Suppose there exists an r 1 -free formula φ from the language of PRSPDL 0 such that the formulas r 1 ⊤? ⊤ and φ are equally interpreted in all separated models. Without loss of generality, assume φ contains neither program variable, nor propositional variable. Moreover, in this proof, we will assume that programs and formulas contain no syntactic element. Let F = (W ,R,⋆) be the separated frame defined as follows: 12 }, x 10 ⋆x 7 = {x 13 } and ⋆ is otherwise empty. Since r 1 ⊤? ⊤ ↔ φ is valid in the class of all separated frames, F |= r 1 ⊤? ⊤ ↔ φ. Let us consider the following partition of W :
• W /Z = {{x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 },{x 4 ,x 6 },{x 5 ,x 7 },{x 8 ,x 10 },{x 9 ,x 11 },{x 12 ,x 13 }}.
9 ,x 12 } and W R = {x 3 ,x 6 ,x 7 ,x 10 ,x 11 ,x 13 }. Let f LR be the function from L into R inductively defined as follows:
Claim: Let α be an r 1 -free program from the language of
Claim: Let α be an r 1 -free program and ψ be an r 1 -free formula from the language of PRSPDL 0 .
Proof: By induction on α and ψ. Left to the reader. Since φ is r 1 -free, x 1 Zx 2 and
The argument concerning r 2 is similar to the previous argument.
Proposition 11
Let a be an atomic program. For all ;-free formulas φ, the formulas (a;a) a ⊤ and φ are not equally interpreted in all separated models.
Proof. Suppose there exists a ;-free formula φ from the language of PRSPDL 0 such that the formulas (a;a) a ⊤ and φ are equally interpreted in all separated models. Without loss of generality, assume a is the only program variable in φ and φ contains no propositional variable. Moreover, in this proof, we will assume that a is the only syntactic element occurring in programs and formulas. Let F = (W ,R,⋆) and F ′ = (W ′ ,R ′ ,⋆ ′ ) be the separated frames defined as follows: W = {x,y,z,t,u,v,w}, R(a) = {(y,w),(w,t),(z,u)} and R is otherwise empty, y⋆z = {x}, t ⋆u = {v} and ⋆ is otherwise empty,
2 )} and R ′ is otherwise empty and
and ⋆ ′ is otherwise empty. Since (a;a) a ⊤ ↔ φ is valid in the class of all separated frames, F |= (a;a) a ⊤ ↔ φ and F ′ |= (a;a) a ⊤ ↔ φ. Let us consider the following binary relation:
Claim: Let α be a ;-free program from the language of PRSPDL 0 . For all r ∈ W and for all r ′ ∈ W ′ ,
By induction on α. Left to the reader.
Claim: Let α be a ;-free program and ψ be a ;-free formula from the language of PRSPDL 0 . For all r ∈ W and for all r ′ ∈ W ′ , if rZr ′ ,
Proof: By induction on α and ψ. Left to the reader. Since φ is ;-free, xZx ′ and x ∈ (φ) M , x ′ ∈ (φ) M ′ : a contradiction.
Proposition 12
Let a be an atomic program. For all -free formulas φ, the formulas a a ⊤ and φ are not equally interpreted in all separated models.
Proof. Suppose there exists a -free formula φ from the language of PRSPDL 0 such that the formulas a a ⊤ and φ are equally interpreted in all separated models. Without loss of generality, assume a is the only program variable in φ and φ contains no propositional variable. Moreover, in this proof, we will assume that a is the only syntactic element occurring in programs and formulas. Let F = (W ,R,⋆) and F ′ = (W ′ ,R ′ ,⋆ ′ ) be the separated frames defined as follows: W = {x,y,z,t,u,v}, R(a) = {(y,t),(z,u)} and R is otherwise empty, y⋆z = {x}, t ⋆u = {v} and ⋆ is otherwise empty,
and ⋆ is otherwise empty. Since a a ⊤ ↔ φ is valid in the class of all separated frames, F |= a a ⊤ ↔ φ and F ′ |= a a ⊤ ↔ φ. Let us consider the following binary relation:
Claim: Let α be a -free program and ψ be a -free formula from the language of PRSPDL 0 . For all r ∈ W and for all r ′ ∈ W ′ , if rZr ′ ,
Proof: By induction on α and ψ. Left to the reader. Since φ is -free, xZx ′ and x ∈ (φ) M , x ′ ∈ (φ) M ′ : a contradiction.
It should be clear from Propositions 8-12 that neither tests, nor the storing programs s 1 and s 2 and the recovering programs r 1 and r 2 , nor the program construct (·;·) of sequential composition, nor the program construct (· ·) of parallel composition can be defined in terms of the other constructs of the language of PRSPDL 0 . Nevertheless,
Proposition 13
Let M = (W ,R,⋆,V ) be a separated model and x ∈ W . For all programs α,β, for all formulas φ and for all atomic formulas p, if p does not occur in α,β,φ, the following conditions are equivalent:
Proof. Suppose there exists programs α,β, there exists a formula φ and there exists an atomic formula p such that p does not occur in α,β,φ and the above conditions are not equivalent. Hence, either x ∈ ( α β φ) M and there exists a separated model
Case 'x ∈ ( α β φ) M and there exists a separated model
Case 'x ∈ ( α β φ) M and for all separated models
Let us temporarily add propositional quantifiers of the form ∀p to the language of PRSPDL 0 for each atomic formula p. Such constructs allow to write formulas of the form ∀pφ. In a model M = (W ,R,⋆,V ), a formula of the form ∀pφ is interpreted as the following subset of W :
A consequence of Proposition 13 is that the program construct (· ·) of parallel composition becomes definable in a modal language strengthened by the introduction of propositional quantifiers. To see this, it suffices to consider the following
Proposition 14
Let α,β be programs, φ be a formula and p an atomic formula. If p does not occur in α,β,φ, the formulas α β φ and ∀p( r 1 α s 1 (φ ∧p)∨ r 2 β s 2 (φ ∧¬p)) are equally interpreted in all separated models.
Proof. By Proposition 13.
In Sections 6 and 7, instead of using axioms to define the program operation of parallel composition in the language of PDL enlarged with propositional quantifiers, we add an unorthodox rule of proof that makes the canonical model standard for the program operation of parallel composition and we use large programs for the proof of the Truth Lemma. In our canonical model construction, large programs will constitute the main ingedients in the proofs of the Existence Lemma (Lemma 10) and the Truth Lemma (Lemma 11). Now, about definability. We investigate the question whether our new constructs can be used to define the following elementary classes of frames: the class of all separated frames; the class of all rich frames; the class of all deterministic frames; the class of all serial frames.
Proposition 15
The class of all separated frames is modally definable by the formulas r 1 
Proof. Left to the reader.
Proposition 16
The class of all rich frames is modally definable by the formula r 1 ⊤ ∨ r 2 ⊤.
Proposition 17
The class of all deterministic frames is modally definable by the formula ⊤? ⊤? p → p.
Proposition 18
The class of all serial frames is not modally definable.
Proof. Suppose there exists a set of formulas from the language of PRSPDL 0 that modally defines the class of all serial frames. Let F = (W ,R,⋆) and F ′ = (W ′ ,R ′ ,⋆ ′ ) be the frames defined as follows: W = {x 1 ,x 2 }, R is the empty function, x 1 ⋆x 1 = {x 1 }, x 2 ⋆x 2 = {x 2 } and otherwise ⋆ is the empty function, W ′ = {x ′ }, R ′ is the empty function and x ′ ⋆ ′ x ′ = {x ′ }. Obviously, F is not serial and F ′ is serial. Since modally defines the class of all serial frames, F |= and F ′ |= . Hence, there exists a formula φ ∈ such that F |= φ. Since F ′ |= , F ′ |= φ. Since F |= φ, there exists a model M = (W ,R,⋆,V ) on F such that either x 1 ∈ (φ) M , or x 2 ∈ (φ) M . Without loss of generality, assume
Claim: Let α be a program and ψ be a formula from the language of PRSPDL 0 . Then,
Proof: By induction on α and ψ. Left to the reader. Since
Axiomatization
This section presents the axiomatization of PRSPDL 0 . But before, we need to say more about the rule of proof (FOR). There is an important point we should make: (FOR) is an infinitary rule of proof, i.e. it has an infinite set of formulas as preconditions. In some ways, it is similar to the rules of proof for the program construct (·∩·) of intersection from [3, 4] . Let us consider the following variant of (FOR):
where p is an atomic formula not occurring inφ,α,β,ψ, inferφ( α β ψ).
Obviously, (FOR ′ ) is a finitary rule of proof, i.e. it has a finite set of formulas-a singleton-as preconditions. How should we demonstrate the rules of proof (FOR) and (FOR ′ ) are equivalent in the sense that they are interchangeable? Let PRSPDL 0 be the least set of formulas that contains the formulas (A1)-(A14) and that is closed under the rules of proof (MP), (N) and (FOR) and PRSPDL ′ 0 be the least set of formulas that contains the formulas (A1)-(A14) and that is closed under the rules of proof (MP), (N) and (FOR ′ ). We shall say that φ is provable in PRSPDL 0 iff φ belongs to PRSPDL 0 , whereas we shall say that φ is provable in PRSPDL ′ 0 iff φ belongs to PRSPDL ′ 0 . The infinitary nature of the rule of proof (FOR) implies that 'PRSPDL 0 -proofs' can be of infinite length whereas the finitary nature of the rule of proof (FOR ′ ) implies that 'PRSPDL ′ 0 -proofs' are always of finite length. More precisely, by definition of PRSPDL 0 and PRSPDL ′ 0 , for all formulas φ,
• φ belongs to PRSPDL 0 iff there exists an ordinal λ and a λ-termed sequence (ψ µ ) µ≤λ of formulas-called a λ-proof of φ in PRSPDL 0 -such that ψ λ = φ and for all µ ≤ λ, either ψ µ is one of the formulas (A1)-(A14), or ψ µ is obtained from previous formulas in the λ-termed sequence (ψ µ ) µ≤λ by means of one of the rules of proof (MP), (N) and (FOR); • φ belongs to PRSPDL ′ 0 iff there exists a non-negative integer λ and a λ-termed sequence (ψ µ ) µ≤λ of formulas-called a λ-proof of φ in PRSPDL ′ 0 -such that ψ λ = φ and for all µ ≤ λ, either ψ µ is one of the formulas (A1)-(A14), or ψ µ is obtained from previous formulas in the λ-termed sequence (ψ µ ) µ≤λ by means of one of the rules of proof (MP), (N) and (FOR ′ ).
Concerning PRSPDL ′ 0 , we have the following.
Lemma 1
Let φ(p) be a formula and λ be a non-negative integer. If there exists a λ-proof of φ(p) in PRSPDL ′ 0 , for all atomic formulas q not occurring in φ(p), there exists a λ-proof of φ(q) in PRSPDL ′ 0 .
Proof. By induction on λ. Left to the reader.
The rules of proof (FOR) and (FOR ′ ) are equivalent in the sense that they are interchangeable. More precisely,
Proposition 19
Let φ be a formula. The following conditions are equivalent:
(1) φ belongs to PRSPDL 0 ; (2) φ belongs to PRSPDL ′ 0 .
Proof. Suppose the above conditions are not equivalent. Hence, either φ belongs to PRSPDL 0 and φ does not belong to PRSPDL ′ 0 , or φ does not belong to PRSPDL 0 and φ belongs to PRSPDL ′ 0 . Case 'φ belongs to PRSPDL 0 and φ does not belong to PRSPDL ′ 0 '. Hence, there exists an ordinal λ and a λ-termed sequence (ψ µ ) µ≤λ of formulas such that ψ λ = φ and for all µ ≤ λ, either ψ µ is one of the formulas (A1)-(A14), or ψ µ is obtained from previous formulas in the λ-termed sequence (ψ µ ) µ≤λ by means of one of the rules of proof (MP), (N) and (FOR). By induction on λ, let us verify that φ belongs to PRSPDL ′ 0 . Cases 'ψ λ is one of the formulas (A1)-(A14)', 'ψ λ is obtained from previous formulas in the λ-termed sequence (ψ µ ) µ≤λ by means of the rule of proof (MP)' and 'ψ λ is obtained from previous formulas in the λ-termed sequence (ψ µ ) µ≤λ by means of the rule of proof (N)'. Left to the reader.
Case 'ψ λ is obtained from previous formulas in the λ-termed sequence (ψ µ ) µ≤λ by means of the rule of proof (FOR)'. Hence, there exists an admissible formφ, there exists programs α,β and there exists a formula ψ such that for all atomic formulas p not occurring inφ,α,β,ψ, φ( r 1 α s 1 (ψ ∧p)∨ r 2 β s 2 (ψ ∧¬p)) is the formula ψ µ for some µ < λ andφ( α β ψ) is the formula ψ λ . Let p be an atomic formula not occurring inφ,α,β,ψ. Thus,φ( r 1 α s 1 (ψ ∧p)∨ r 2 β s 2 (ψ ∧¬p)) is the formula ψ µ for some µ < λ. By induction hypothesis,φ( r 1 α s 1 (ψ ∧ p)∨ r 2 β s 2 (ψ ∧¬p)) belongs to PRSPDL ′ 0 . Since p does not occur inφ,α,β,ψ, ψ λ belongs to PRSPDL ′ 0 : a contradiction. Case 'φ does not belong to PRSPDL 0 and φ belongs to PRSPDL ′ 0 '. Hence, there exists an non-negative integer λ and a λ-termed sequence (ψ µ ) µ≤λ of formulas such that ψ λ = φ and for all µ ≤ λ, either ψ µ is one of the formulas (A1)-(A14), or ψ µ is obtained from previous formulas in the λ-termed sequence (ψ µ ) µ≤λ by means of one of the rules of proof (MP), (N) and (FOR ′ ). By induction on λ, let us verify that φ belongs to PRSPDL 0 .
Cases 'ψ λ is one of the formulas (A1)-(A14)', 'ψ λ is obtained from previous formulas in the λ-termed sequence (ψ µ ) µ≤λ by means of the rule of proof (MP)' and 'ψ λ is obtained from previous formulas in the λ-termed sequence (ψ µ ) µ≤λ by means of the rule of proof (N)'. Left to the reader.
Case 'ψ λ is obtained from previous formulas in the λ-termed sequence (ψ µ ) µ≤λ by means of the rule of proof (FOR ′ )'. Hence, there exists an admissible formφ, there exists programs α,β and there exists a formula ψ such thatφ( r 1 α s 1 (ψ ∧p)∨ r 2 β s 2 (ψ ∧¬p))-where p is an atomic formula not occurring inφ,α,β,ψ-is the formula ψ µ for some µ < λ andφ( α β ψ) is the formula ψ λ . Thus, there exists a µ-proof ofφ( r 1 α s 1 (ψ ∧p)∨ r 2 β s 2 (ψ ∧¬p)) in PRSPDL ′ 0 . By Lemma 1, since p is an atomic formula not occurring inφ,α,β,ψ, for all atomic formulas q not occurring inφ,α,β,ψ, there exists a µ-proof ofφ( r 1 α s 1 (ψ ∧q)∨ r 2 β s 2 (ψ ∧¬q)) in PRSPDL ′ 0 . By induction hypothesis, for all atomic formulas q not occurring in φ,α,β,ψ,φ( r 1 α s 1 (ψ ∧q)∨ r 2 β s 2 (ψ ∧¬q)) belongs to PRSPDL 0 . Therefore, ψ λ belongs to PRSPDL 0 : a contradiction.
Hence, as long as one is interested in the notion of derivability, (FOR) and (FOR ′ ) are equivalent. To see how the rule of proof (FOR) works, let us demonstrate the following
Proof. By induction on α(φ?). Case 'α(φ?) = β(φ?) γ '. By (A10), β(φ?) γ χ → r 1 β(φ?) s 1 (χ ∧p)∨ r 2 γ s 2 (χ ∧ ¬p) ∈ PRSPDL 0 for every atomic formula p not occurring in β(φ?), γ , ψ, χ. By induction hypothesis, β(φ?) γ χ → r 1 β(ψ?) s 1 (χ ∧p)∨ r 2 γ s 2 (χ ∧¬p) ∈ PRSPDL 0 for every atomic formula p not occurring in β(φ?), γ , ψ, χ. Hence, [ β(φ?) 
Case 'α(φ?) = β γ (φ?)'. Similar to the case 'α(φ?) = β(φ?) γ '.
Having said this, now, let us establish the soundness for PRSPDL 0 :
Proposition 20 (Soundness for PRSPDL 0 ) Let φ be a formula. If φ ∈ PRSPDL 0 , φ is valid in the class of all separated frames.
Proof. By Propositions 4-7.
The completeness for PRSPDL 0 is more difficult to establish and we defer proving it till next section. In the meantime, it is well worth noting that for all separated models M = (W ,R,⋆,V ) and for all x ∈ W , {φ: x ∈ (φ) M } is a set of formulas that contains PRSPDL 0 and that is closed under the rule of proof (MP). Now, we introduce theories. A set S of formulas is said to be a theory iff PRSPDL 0 ⊆ S and S is closed under the rules of proof (MP) and (FOR). We will use S,T ,... for theories. Obviously, the least theory is PRSPDL 0 and the greatest theory is the set of all formulas. We will use the following property of theories without explicit reference.
Lemma 3
Let S be a theory. The following conditions are equivalent:
• S is equal to the set of all formulas;
• there exists a formula φ such that φ ∈ S and ¬φ ∈ S; • ⊥ ∈ S.
We shall say that a theory S is consistent iff for all formulas φ, either φ ∈ S, or ¬φ ∈ S. By Lemma 3, there is only one inconsistent theory: the set of all formulas. A theory S is said to be maximal iff for all formulas φ, either φ ∈ S, or ¬φ ∈ S. In Section 7, the canonical frame of PRSPDL 0 and the canonical model of PRSPDL 0 will be based on the set of all maximal consistent theories, whereas in the classical literature [7, Chapter 4] , canonical frames and canonical models are based on the set of all maximal consistent sets of formulas. The truth is that every maximal consistent theory is a maximal consistent set of formulas in the classical sense, whereas every maximal consistent set of formulas closed under the rule of proof (FOR) is a maximal consistent theory. Hence,
Lemma 4
Let S be a maximal consistent theory. We have:
• for all formulas φ, ¬φ ∈ S iff φ ∈ S;
• for all formulas φ,ψ, φ ∨ψ ∈ S iff either φ ∈ S, or ψ ∈ S.
If α is a program, φ is a formula and S is a theory, let [α]S = {φ: [α]φ ∈ S} and S +φ = {ψ: φ → ψ ∈ S}. Sets of the form [a]S will be used while defining the canonical relations R c (a) in the canonical frame of PRSPDL 0 . Sets of the form S +φ will be used while demonstrating Lemma 7. We have the following.
Lemma 5
Let S be a theory. For all programs α and for all formulas φ, we have: 2) [α]S is a theory; (3) S +φ is a theory; (4) S +φ is the least theory containing S and φ; (5) S +φ is consistent iff ¬φ ∈ S.
Proof. (1) . By (A3). 
. By (1) and (2). (4). Left to the reader. (5) . By Lemma 4.
In the classical literature, three Lemmas support the canonical model construction: the Lindenbaum Lemma [7, Lemma 4.17] , the Existence Lemma [7, Lemma 4.20] and the Truth Lemma [7, Lemma 4.21 ]. Our canonical model construction is also built on the same three Lemmas. Nevertheless, the fact that the canonical frame of PRSPDL 0 and the canonical model of PRSPDL 0 are based on the set of all maximal consistent theories creates some subtleties that we will now attack from the front. The Lindenbaum Lemma will say that every consistent theory can be extended to a maximal consistent theory. Hence, in a first setting, we have to learn how to extend a consistent theory by means of a formula.
Lemma 6
Let S be a theory. If S is consistent, for all formulas φ, either S +φ is consistent, or there exists a formula ψ such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• S +ψ is consistent;
• ψ → ¬φ ∈ PRSPDL 0 ;
• if φ is in the formχ( α β θ) of a conclusion of the rule of proof (FOR), there exists an atomic formula p not occurring in φ such that ψ → ¬χ (
Proof. Suppose S is consistent and φ is a formula such that S +φ is not consistent. By Lemma 5, ¬φ ∈ S. Obviously, there are finitely many, say k ≥ 0, representations of φ in the form of a conclusion of the rule of proof (FOR):
We define by induction a sequence (ψ 0 ,...,ψ k ) of formulas such that for all l ∈ N, if l ≤ k, the following conditions are satisfied: S +ψ l is consistent; 
Obviously, the following conditions are satisfied: S +ψ l is consistent; ψ l → ¬φ ∈ PRSPDL 0 ; for all m ∈ N, if 1 ≤ m ≤ l, there exists an atomic formula p not occurring in φ such that
Finally, the reader may easily verify that the following conditions are satisfied: S +ψ k is consistent; ψ k → ¬φ ∈ PRSPDL 0 ; if φ is in the formχ ( α β θ ) of a conclusion of the rule of proof (FOR), there exists an atomic formula p not occurring in φ such that
Now, knowing how to extend a consistent theory by means of a formula, we can demonstrate the Lindenbaum Lemma.
Lemma 7 (Lindenbaum Lemma) Let S be a theory. If S is consistent, there exists a maximal consistent theory containing S.
Proof. Suppose S is consistent. Since there are countably many formulas, there exists an enumeration φ 1 ,φ 2 ,... of the set of all formulas. Let T 0 ,T 1 ,... be the sequence of consistent theories inductively defined as follows. First, let T 0 = S. Obviously, T 0 is consistent. Secondly, let n ≥ 1 be such that consistent theories T 0 ,...,T n−1 have already been defined. Thirdly, by Lemma 6, either T n−1 +φ n is consistent, or there exists a formula ψ such that the following conditions are satisfied: T n−1 +ψ is consistent; ψ → ¬φ n ∈ PRSPDL 0 ; if φ n is in the formχ( α β θ) of a conclusion of the rule of proof (FOR), there exists an atomic formula p not occurring inχ ,α,β,θ such that ψ → ¬χ ( r 1 α s 1 (θ ∧ p)∨ r 2 β s 2 (θ ∧¬p)) ∈ PRSPDL 0 . In the former case, let T n = T n−1 +φ n . In the latter case, let T n = T n−1 +ψ. Obviously, T n is consistent. Finally, the reader may easily verify that T 0 ∪T 1 ∪... is a maximal consistent theory containing S.
Completeness
This section proves the completeness of PRSPDL 0 . The canonical frame of PRSPDL 0 is the 3-tuple Proof. Suppose F c is not separated. Hence, there exists a maximal consistent theory S such that card(⋆ c (S)) ≥ 2. Thus, there exists maximal consistent theories T ,U,V ,W such that S ∈ T ⋆ c U, S ∈ V ⋆ c W and either T = V , or U = W . Without loss of generality, suppose T = V . Hence, there exists a formula φ such that φ ∈ T and φ ∈ V . Since S ∈ T ⋆ c U and
The canonical model of PRSPDL 0 is the 4-tuple
is the canonical valuation of PRSPDL 0 , i.e. the function from the set of all atomic formulas into the set of all sets of maximal consistent theories defined by S ∈ V c (p) iff p ∈ S. In our canonical model construction, the ordinary form of the Existence Lemma would be as follows: for all programs α, for all formulas φ and for all maximal consistent theories S, if [α]φ ∈ S, there exists a maximal consistent theory T such that [α]S ⊆ T and φ ∈ T . Nevertheless, it happens that the proof of our Truth Lemma (Lemma 11) needs a stronger form of the Existence Lemma. This stronger form requires the use of a new modal concept: large programs. For all consistent theories S, letS be a new symbol at our disposal. Now, the set of all large programs is inductively defined as follows:
We will use A,B,... for large programs. Let us be clear that each large program is a finite string of symbols coming from an uncountable alphabet. It follows that there are uncountably many large programs. For convenience, we omit the parentheses in accordance with the standard rules. It is essential that large programs are built up from atomic programs, symbols for consistent theories, storing constructs and recovering constructs by means of the constructs (·;·) and (· ·). Let A(S 1 ,...,S n ) be a large program with (S 1 ,...,S n ) a sequence of some of its symbols for consistent theories. The result of the replacement ofS 1 ,...,S n in their places withT 1 ,...,T n is another large program which will be denoted A(T 1 ,...,T n ). A large program A(S 1 ,...,S n ) with (S 1 ,...,S n ) the sequence of all its symbols for consistent theories will be defined to be maximal if the theories S 1 ,...,S n are maximal. In the canonical model, every large program will be interpreted as a binary relation over the set of all maximal consistent theories. To define such a binary relation, one needs to view each large program as a set of programs. In this respect, the kernel function ker: A → ker(A) ⊆ PR is inductively defined as follows:
• ker(a) = {a};
• ker(S) = {φ?: φ ∈ S}; • ker(s 1 ) = {s 1 }; • ker(s 2 ) = {s 2 };
• ker(r 1 ) = {r 1 };
• ker(r 2 ) = {r 2 };
• ker(A;B) = {α;β: α ∈ ker(A) and β ∈ ker(B)};
• ker(A B) = {α β: α ∈ ker(A) and β ∈ ker(B)}.
Lemma 9 will be put to good use in the proof of the Existence Lemma.
Lemma 9
Let α be a program. For all maximal consistent theories S and for all formulas φ, if α(φ?) ⊤ ∈ S, for all formulas ψ, we have: either α((φ ∧ψ)?) ⊤ ∈ S, or there exists a formula χ such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• α((φ ∧χ )?) ⊤ ∈ S;
• χ → ¬ψ ∈ PRSPDL 0 ;
• if ψ is in the formτ ( β γ θ) of a conclusion of the rule of proof (FOR), there exists an atomic formula p not occurring in α,φ,ψ,χ such that χ → ¬τ ( r 1 β s 1 (θ ∧p)∨ r 2 γ s 2 (θ ∧ ¬p)) ∈ PRSPDL 0 .
Proof. Suppose S is a maximal consistent theory and φ is a formula such that α(φ?) ⊤ ∈ S and ψ is a formula such that α((φ ∧ψ)?) ⊤ ∈ S. By (A11), α((φ ∧¬ψ)?) ⊤ ∈ S. Obviously, there are finitely many, say k ≥ 0, representations of ψ in the form of a conclusion of the rule of proof (FOR):τ 1 ( β 1 γ 1 θ 1 ) ,...,τ k ( β k γ k θ k ). We define by induction a sequence (χ 0 ,...,χ k ) of formulas such that for all l ∈ N, if l ≤ k, the following conditions are satisfied: α((φ ∧χ l )?) ⊤ ∈ S; χ l → ¬ψ ∈ PRSPDL 0 ; for all m ∈ N, if 1 ≤ m ≤ l, there exists an atomic formula p not occurring in α,φ,ψ,χ l such that χ l → ¬τ m ( r 1 Proof. Suppose there exists a maximal consistent theory S such that [α]φ ∈ S. Since S is maximal, α ¬φ ∈ S. By (A12), f (α) ¬φ ∈ S. Without loss of generality, suppose f (α) contains exactly one test, say ψ?. Since f (α) ¬φ ∈ S, f (α)(ψ?);¬φ? ⊤ ∈ S. Since there are countably many formulas, there exists an enumeration χ 1 ,χ 2 ,... of the set of all formulas. Let θ 0 ,θ 1 ,... and τ 0 ,τ 1 ,... be the sequences of formulas inductively defined as follows such that for all n ∈ N, f (α)(θ n ?);τ n ? ⊤ ∈ S. First, let θ 0 = ψ and τ 0 = ¬φ. Obviously, f (α)(θ 0 ?);τ 0 ? ⊤ ∈ S. Secondly, let n ≥ 1 be such that formulas θ 0 ,...,θ n−1 and τ 0 ,...,τ n−1 have already been defined. Hence, f (α)(θ n−1 ?);τ n−1 ? ⊤ ∈ S. Thirdly, by Lemma 9, either f (α)((θ n−1 ∧χ n )?);τ n−1 ? ⊤ ∈ S, or there exists a formula µ such that the following conditions are satisfied: f (α)((θ n−1 ∧µ)?);τ n−1 ? ⊤ ∈ S; µ → ¬χ n ∈ PRSPDL 0 ; if χ n is in the formω( β γ ν) of a conclusion of the rule of proof (FOR), there exists an atomic formula p not occurring in α,θ n−1 ,τ n−1 ,χ n ,µ such that µ → ¬ω( r 1 β s 1 (ν ∧p)∨ r 2 γ s 2 (ν ∧¬p)) ∈ PRSPDL 0 . In the former case, let θ n = θ n−1 ∧χ n . In the latter case, let θ n = θ n−1 ∧µ. Obviously, f (α)(θ n ?);τ n−1 ? ⊤ ∈ S. By Lemma 9, either f (α)(θ n ?);(τ n−1 ∧χ n )? ⊤ ∈ S, or there exists a formula µ ′ such that the following conditions are satisfied: f (α)(θ n ?); (τ n−1 ∧µ ′ )? ⊤) ∈ S; µ ′ → ¬χ n ∈ PRSPDL 0 ; if χ n is in the formω( β γ ν) of a conclusion of the rule of proof (FOR), there exists an atomic formula p not occurring in α,θ n ,τ n−1 ,χ n ,µ such that µ ′ → ¬ω( r 1 β s 1 (ν ∧
